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 With United States Special Operations Command 
(USSOCOM) being given the role as the lead Combatant 
Command in fighting the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) 
USSOCOM must examine ways to engage terrorists on a global 
scale.  USSOCOM must look at means other than direct action 
to defeat these terrorist networks.  It must also look at 
the entire network and not just the cells that carry out 
the terrorist operations.  
Terrorist Financing is an integral part of the GWOT, 
though; thus far it has mostly been pursued by law 
enforcement agencies rather than the U.S. Military.   This 
is due to the perception that terrorist financing is 
criminal in nature and relegated to law enforcement 
agencies rather a threat to national security that would be 
the responsibility military.  
This thesis serves two purposes.  The first is to 
analyze whether the U.S. military and Special Operations 
Forces (SOF) in particular should look at terrorist 
financing as part of the military’s role in the GWOT and 
what that possible role could be.  The second is to look at 
how SOF could organize itself in order to carry out such a 
role should it be necessary to do so.  Ironically, during 
the time this thesis was being written DoD has determined 
that SOF does have a role in terrorist financing and that 
USSOCOM will be the executive agent for the DoD with 
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This thesis as well as my Master’s degree would not 
have been possible without my children, who have inspired 
me to set an example that I would want them to follow.  
Hopefully, I have demonstrated that education and self 
improvement are not important because I told them they are, 


























The purpose of this thesis is to answer United States 
Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) research question A06. 
“Discuss a special operations role, if any, in cutting off 
funds used for terrorist activities. Are special operations 
suited to conduct an analysis of transnational crime, use 
of the internet to recruit and raise funds, and the flow of 
illicit funds to the militant terrorists from their 
financial backers?”1 
The central research question will be, what roles 
could SOF could be used for in gathering intelligence to 
gain a better operational picture on how the terrorist 
networks are funded and connected?  With the ever expanding 
scope of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) does the 
military and Special Operations Forces (SOF) in particular 
have a role to play in defeating terrorist funding as well 
as the terrorists themselves? 
B. RELEVANCY  
The top high value target that the U.S. government is 
perusing, Osama bin Laden, came to prominence in terrorist 
organizations not through his operational expertise, but 
instead through his financing capabilities.  During the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Osama bin Laden ran Makhtab 
al Khadimat (MAK) in Pakistan, which financially aided the 
mujahideen who were fighting the Soviets inside 
Afghanistan.  MAK recruited and trained non-afghani Muslims 
to fight against the Soviets inside Afghanistan.   
                     1 Joint Special Operations University 2005 Research Topics list 
2After leaving MAK in 1987, Osama bin Laden formed al 
Qaeda in 1988 and by the 1990’s was in Sudan financing 
terrorist training camps while continuing to invest and 
raise money for future terrorist operations including the 
1998 U.S. Embassy bombings in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es 
Salaam, Tanzania; the 2000 USS Cole bombing in Yemen; as 
well as the 2001 World Trade Center/Pentagon attacks using 
hijacked commercial aircraft.  
There is a maxim among military experts - "Amateurs 
study strategy and tactics; professionals study logistics.  
In asymmetric warfare the enemy is not moving large amounts 
of men and material as a conventional Army is required to 
do, it is simply moving money, which, is the most fluid and 
easily transportable form of logistics. 
Still, many will still see terrorist financing as 
criminal in nature and residing in the realm of law 
enforcement rather than a problem that the military should 
be addressing.  This conventional mindset continues despite 
the fact that terrorists are operating in an asymmetric 
battle space and using tactics described as 4th Generation 
Warfare (4GW), and that financial funding is key to their 
ability to carrying out their terrorist operations.  That 
said, funding is one of the terrorist networks’ 
vulnerabilities that should be exploited.   
The conventional or traditional mindset relative to 
terrorist financing was also the basis for the same 
reasoning within the Department of Defense (DoD) that 
caused the military to ignore pre 9/11 terrorism by 
dismissing it as a criminal activity, rather than a 
military or national security issue.  This conventional 
mindset is highlighted in the article published in 
3“Showstoppers” by Richard Schultz in The Weekly Standard.  
With terrorism now a clear and present danger to the 
security of the United States, the GWOT has elevated 
terrorism and terrorists above the military horizon and 
made terrorism a national security issue.       
So one might justifiably ask what makes the United 
States military in general and USSOCOM specifically, suited 
or even willing to target terrorist financing as a means of 
fighting the GWOT? 
Is this merely redundant effort by the DoD that 
duplicates what Law Enforcement Agencies (LEA’s) are 
already doing with respect to terrorist financing?  In some 
respects, yes it would be, but in others no.  The role of 
SOF and DoD in terrorist financing would serve to enhance 
the efforts that the LEA’s are doing with terrorist 
financing, not replace them.  Though USSOCOM has the 
responsibility as the executive agent for conducting the 
GWOT, it still may be unwilling to participate in terrorist 
financing, and that is a matter of relevancy.  SOF knows 
that it needs to stay relevant in the GWOT if it is to grow 
and be an integral part of the United States military. 
The 9/11 Commission and President Bush has recommended 
that “the U.S. government shift the focus of its efforts to 
counter terrorist financing from a strategy based on 
seizing terrorist assets to a strategy based on exploiting 
intelligence gathered from financial investigations”.2  
According to the Commission, the United States should 
“expect less from trying to dry up terrorist money and more  
 
                     2 Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress, Removing 
Terrorist Sanctuaries, 10 August 2004. 
4from following the money for intelligence, as a tool to 
hunt terrorists, understand their networks, and disrupt 
their operations.”3 
In order to effectively combat terrorist financing, 
the United States must bring to bear a coordinated effort 
of all its elements of national power including 
intelligence gathering, financial regulation, law 
enforcement, and even the Department of Defense.  The 
justification for the use of DoD to combat an enemy that 
was previously relegated to the law enforcement realm is 
that 9/11 elevated terrorism above the military horizon.4  
As a result, LEA agencies and DoD, along with an 
international coalition would subsequently form the basis 
for effectively targeting terrorist financing.   
Granted, the DoD would only be a small but effective 
part of this inter-agency effort and the success of this 
effort would be dependant on inter-agency cooperation.   
Any DoD or SOF role would be an ancillary part of the 
targeting of terrorist financing.  Initially SOF would 
begin taking the intelligence that it receives through its 
passive collection while conducting other missions and 
providing it to other agencies to confirm, refute, or 
simply fill in the intelligence gaps of current 
investigations.  Later as its capabilities and database 
grows, SOF could begin targeting terrorist financiers both 
unilaterally and for other traditionally domestic U.S.  
                      3 Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress, Removing 
Terrorist Sanctuaries, 10 August 2004. 
4 When a social organization, in this case a terrorist group or 
narco-trafficker has evolved to a point that they wage war or commit 
acts of terrorism as their primary role and not an ancillary one.  
Turney-High, Primitive War: Its Practice and Concepts, 1991. 
5agencies that do not have the ability, cultural awareness, 
or operational experience to conduct missions outside the 
borders of the U.S. 
The inter-agency focus and cooperation cannot be 
overemphasized.  Once you start mapping these terrorist 
financial networks, you are never totally sure where they 
will lead you.  Should the DoD’s mapping of terrorist 
financing networks reveal links to U.S. citizens or 
officials of governments who are friendly to the United 
States, then that intelligence needs to be passed to the 
FBI and Department of State respectively, as those agencies 
have the charter to deal with those issues.   
C. SCOPE 
This type of joint military/law enforcement 
involvement is not without precedence.  When the flow of 
drugs into the United States rose to levels that began to 
overwhelm law enforcement and the Drug Enforcement Agency, 
the War on Drugs brought the United States military into 
the fold and elevated illegal narcotics above the military 
horizon5.   
New roles and relationships had to be explored for the 
U.S. military that had not previously been considered.  
Military involvement with other U.S. agencies in targeting 
terrorist financing will insure more of the same types of 
considerations.  
This thesis will also look at the United States 
military’s involvement with the War on Drugs as the DoD 
continues to transform itself to stay relevant so as to be 
able to engage threats to the national security of the 
United States of America.   
                     5 Turney-High, Primitive War: Its Practice and Concepts, 1991. 
6The DoD has now begun to address terrorist financing 
with the creation of the Threat Financing Exploitation Unit 
(TFEU) as a pilot program in the Central Command (CENTCOM) 
Area of Responsibility (AOR).  The TFEU program is now 
being considered for expansion to other Combatant Commands, 
but USSOCOM remains the executive agent for terrorist 
financing.   



















7II. IS THIS A SOF MISSION? 
While the introductory chapter focused on the primary 
research question as to whether SOF could be used to target 
terrorist financing this current chapter will focus on 
whether SOF should be used in combating terrorist 
financing.  SOF is a finite resource and is in danger of 
being marginalized by the current tendency to use SOF 
assets to accomplish missions that are not “true SOF 
missions.”  However, terrorist financing is hardly a 
conventional mission.  The danger, though, in being known 
as an organization that can accomplish just about anything 
is that you will eventually be asked to accomplish 
everything. 
If financing is a vulnerable area of terrorist 
organizations that can be exploited, then DoD and SOF 
should capitalize on this opportunity, even though it falls 
outside the traditional role of the military.  The 
asymmetric nature of the GWOT necessitates that we look at 
non-traditional roles in fighting an enemy who avoids the 
strengths of the U.S. Military and exploits our weaknesses. 
In his famous dictum, the military strategist Carl von 
Clausewitz asserts that “war is the continuation of 
politics, by other means”.6  Modern military planners 
accept this, but have yet to fully incorporate it into 
military planning.  With the advent of the GWOT and its 
asymmetric nature, we must look beyond the physical battle 
space and also consider the human and political centers of 
gravity as the battle space as well. Then it is possible to 
see that there may be an extension of Clausewitz’s dictum, 
                     6 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, 1976. 
8and that is, “politics is the continuation of economics, by 
other means”.  SOF should look to exploit any vulnerability 
of terrorist networks, whether they are financial, command 
and control, culutural, communications, or others. 
The more unconventional the war, the more this needs 
to be understood.  The responsibility for conducting the 
GWOT within the U.S. military has been given to USSOCOM 
precisely because of its unconventional mindset and 
capability to fight an enemy whose asymmetric nature there 
is no established doctrinal template for.  The fact that 
this same military is waging a global war on terrorism 
should not limit its courses of actions (COA’s) to those 
that fall in the roles previously unique to other non-
military U.S. agencies. 
 
A. SOF MISSION CRITERIA 
Is terrorist financing a SOF mission?  Using SOF’s own 
five mission criteria to judge whether a mission should or 
shouldn’t be executed by SOF, we can overlay this mission 
template on the problem of terrorist financing. 
1. Appropriate Mission 
Special operations forces (SOF) should be used against 
those key strategic or operational targets that require 
SOF's unique skills and capabilities. If they do not, then 
SOF should not be assigned. SOF should not be used as a 
substitute for other forces.7 
Terrorist financing is a key strategic target in the 
GWOT and there are currently no forces in DoD that could be 
                     7 Publication: JP 3-05.2 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 
for Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning 
9capable of targeting terrorist financing.  USSOCOM is the 
only Combatant Command that is by its very definition an 
unconventional unit and whose members are flexible enough 
to conduct a mission for which there is no current 
doctrine.  This will never be seen as a core mission of 
SOF.  This will be an ancillary mission that is conducted 
while SOF is conducting its core missions.  SOF does not 
need to add new core missions to conduct the GWOT; it need 
only redefine the parameters in which it conducts it 
current core missions. 
2. Support the Campaign Plan 
If the mission does not support the joint force 
commander's (JFC's) campaign plan, then consider more 
appropriate missions available for special operations 
forces (SOF).8 
A USSOCOM role in targeting terrorist financing does 
support the GWOT campaign plan in that it would curtail the 
flow of funding that terrorist need to conduct their 
operations, training, and logistics.   
Even the Commander in Chief has placed an emphasis on 
terrorist financing in a statement made just after 9/11.   
The American people must understand this war on 
terrorism will be fought on a variety of fronts, 
in different ways.  The front lines will look 
different from the wars of the past.   
  We will starve the terrorists of funding, turn 
them against each other, root them out of their 
safe hiding places and bring them to justice.9 
 
                     8 Publication: JP 3-05.2 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 
for Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning. 
9 President George Bush, Speech to Joint Session of Congress, 
September 24, 2001 
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3. Operationally Feasible  
Special operations forces (SOF) are not structured for 
attrition or force-on-force warfare and should not be 
assigned missions that are beyond their capabilities. SOF 
commanders and their staffs must take into consideration 
the vulnerability of SOF units to larger, more heavily 
armed or mobile forces, particularly in hostile territory.10 
The asymmetric nature of the GWOT and it’s guerrilla 
tactics have shown a lack determination by the enemies of 
the United States and its coalition partners to engage in a 
force on force conventional style battle.  
In incorporating the disruption of terrorist financing 
as an ancillary mission, SOF will be not be exposed to any 
more additional risk than they would be while conducting 
their primary mission for being in this OCONUS11 location.  
These SOF units will be conducting the passive collection 
of intelligence just as they would normally do for 
situational awareness and force protection. It is the 
placement of SOF in these OCONUS locations, along with 
their cultural awareness, that make them ideally suited to 
collect intelligence that other U.S. LEA’s cannot.  Again, 
it will be iterated to the unit conducting the mission that 
this ancillary role involves the passive collection of 
intelligence.  Intelligence on terrorist financing will not 
be dictated as the priority intelligence requirements 
(PIR’s) for SOF unit in OCONUS location, but instead will 
                     10 Publication: JP 3-05.2 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 
for Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning 
11 Outside the Continental United States or OCONUS Is a term used 
reference how the U.S. government is restricted by the Posse Comitatus 
Act of 1878 from using the Armed Forces in a domestic law enforcement 
role. 
11
be included simply as intelligence requirements (IR’s) that 
are to be reported if the intelligence is available. 
If intelligence on terrorist financing is not 
available without incurring additional risk, or if it is 
simply not pertinent in the OCONUS area that the SOF 
element is conducting its primary mission, then the SOF 
element can feel free to report as such. 
4. Required Resources Available 
Some special operations forces (SOF) missions require 
support from other forces for success. Support involves 
aiding, protecting, complementing, and sustaining employed 
SOF. It can include airlift, intelligence, communications, 
information operations (IO), medical, logistic, space, 
weather, and numerous other types of support. While a 
target may be vulnerable to SOF, deficiencies in 
supportability may affect the likelihood for success or may 
entirely invalidate the feasibility of employing SOF.12 
At the operational level no additional resources are 
needed to gather the intelligence on terrorist financing. 
5.    Outcome Justifies Risk 
Does the expected outcome justify the risk? Special 
Operations forces (SOF) have high value and limited 
resources. Commanders must ensure that the benefits of 
successful mission execution are measurable and in balance 
with the risks inherent in the mission. Assessment of risk 




                     12 Publication: JP 3-05.2 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 
for Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning 
12
SOF units and equipment, but also the risks to US 
diplomatic and political interests should the mission 
fail.13 
The purpose of using SOF to gather intelligence in 
combating terrorist financing is to gather both tactical 
intelligence that is actionable by SOF and strategic 
intelligence that can be used by other U.S. agencies 
outside the DoD to fill gaps in their intelligence 
shortfalls, as well as provide insight for diplomatic 
evaluations of both enemy and allied nations of the U.S.  
B. SHOWSTOPPERS 
Even prior to 9/11 DoD had elite special mission units 
whose sole purpose was preemptive surgical military 
offensive operations against unconventional enemies of the 
United States, namely non-state actors, such as terrorists.  
Yet, these units were not employed against terrorists.  Not 
only were they employed in a preemptive role, they were 
never even employed in a retaliatory role for terrorist 
acts against the United States such as the 1993 World Trade 
Center Bombing or the bombing of the USS Cole in Yemen in 
2000.   
In the January 26, 2004 issue of “The Weekly Standard” 
Richard H. Schultz, the director of international security 
studies at the Fletcher School, Tufts University wrote an 
article titled Nine reasons why we never sent our Special 
Operations Forces after al Qaeda before 9/11.  This article 
highlighted nine mutually reinforcing, self-imposed 
constraints referred to as “showstoppers” that the military 
                     13 Publication: JP 3-05.2 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 
for Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning 
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used to keep these special mission units from deploying and 
conducting operations.  
These very same showstoppers elaborated below were 
initially used to keep DoD from combating terrorism may 
again be reused again to keep SOF from targeting terrorist 
financing. 
1. Terrorist Financing as Crime 
The military views terrorist financing as criminal in 
nature rather than a national security issue.  By keeping 
terrorist financing as a criminal activity, just as 
terrorism was viewed as a crime and not a security issue, 
it may be kept under the purview of LEA’s rather than the 
military despite that SOF has a core mission of combating 
terrorism. 
2. Not a Clear and Present Danger or War 
Terrorist Financing is not a clear and present danger 
or war.  Once again the military will ignore terrorist 
financing by treating it as a criminal problem as opposed 
to a national security problem, allowing the military to 
continue to ignore it. 
3. Somalia Syndrome 
President Clinton approved the raid to capture Somali 
Warlord Mohammad Farrah Aidid against the recommendations 
of some of the senior military leaders.  The firefight and 
loss of American lives only reinforced the Joint Chiefs in 
their view that SOF should never be trusted with 
independent operations.  Though SOF is by definition 
unconventional, terrorist financing may be seen as too far 
out of the realm of the U.S. military, and senior military 
officers could attempt to dissuade a presidential 
administration from using DoD assets, citing precedents 
14
like Somalia to show what happens when SOF is used for 
operations outside the strict self-imposed boundaries 
placed on it by the military.   
4. No Legal Authority 
Using SOF to passively collect intelligence while 
other LEA’s have the charter also to do so would lead to 
confusion over for whom SOF is working.  While the 
capability exists for DoD to combat terrorist financing, 
the authority for DoD to do so as a military mission is not 
clearly defined.  
5. Risk Aversion 
The senior military leadership got to the positions 
they are in by working within the system and maintaining 
the status quo.  Now are they to be told that the current 
system (the same system that promoted them to the highest 
ranks in the military), is flawed, unresponsive, and close-
minded when it comes to dealing in asymmetric warfare.   
We should not be surprised when this same leadership 
steers clear of operations that are deemed too risky. 
6. Pariah Cowboys 
Civilian champions that favor the use of SOF could be 
in short supply.  Many other government agencies would see 
SOF as intruding onto their turf.  Again, in this instance, 
solving the problem of terrorism comes second to 
maintaining the health of the bureaucracy.  Those who favor 
a military approach to terrorism would be seen as reckless 
and told to let the professionals in the non-military LEA’s 
handle the terrorist financing threat. 
7. Intimidation of Civilians 
This would most likely be the weakest of the 
showstoppers that could be argued against the use of SOF. 
15
In fact it would be the civilian members of the other 
agencies that would be trying to intimidate the military as 
the newcomers to the agencies’ respective areas of 
expertise.  Yet it is because SOF would be newcomers that 
it could look at terrorist financiers in a new light, and 
not as criminals as the LEA’s view them.  SOF would see 
them simply as the enemy and look for vulnerabilities in 
stopping them, not building a criminal case against them.   
8. Big Footprints 
USSOCOM has evolved to the point where it has become 
its own bureaucracy, with all the survival issues, self 
preservation issues, and self perpetuating issues that are 
associated with a bureaucracy.  Where SOF was once lean and 
adaptive, it is now in danger of becoming bloated and 
lethargic.  The problem with bureaucracies is that they do 
not solve problems as much as they manage them.  The GWOT 
and the terrorist financing that is an inherent part of 
terrorism do not constitute a war that will be won or lost 
by the DoD.  The reason that DoD is involved in terrorism 
is that 9/11 brought terrorism above the military horizon.  
DoD need not win the GWOT, it only needs to push it back 
below the military horizon and back into the law 
enforcement and diplomatic realms.  Therefore USSOCOM could 
be hesitant to dedicate a small, flexible, and adaptive 
unit to combat terrorist financing only to have that unit 
work itself right of a job when it could simply manage but 
never solve the threat and ensure that the bureaucracy 
would not only survive, but grow as well. 
9. No Actionable Intelligence 
Even if SOF is willing to accept that terrorist 
financing is an area in which DoD and SOF can disrupt the 
terrorist networks operability, there are still those 
16
within DoD and SOF who can simply keep the intelligence 
requirements sufficiently narrow enough that the actual 
targeting of terrorist financial networks will never become 
a reality. 
C. PARADIGM SHIFT 
Combating terrorist financing will be an ancillary 
role for SOF, not an additional core mission.  Nor should 
this be viewed as a unilateral mission by SOF.  Rather it 
will be an inter-agency effort with SOF supporting the 
efforts of other agencies such as Department of State, 
Treasury, and Justice.  Where joint operations were the 
trend in the past, the future will call for an inter-agency 
effort and compatibility. 
Innovation of this type is not new to SOF.  The War on 
Drugs necessitated that SOF work with other agencies such 
as the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), Department of 
Transportation, and U.S. Customs.  SOF was innovative, 
adaptive and successful in its role in the War on Drugs.  
As in its inter-agency role in the War on Drugs, SOF will 
neither win nor lose the GWOT, it will simply be an asset 
used by the United States to reduce the capabilities of our 
enemies to fall back below the military horizon. 
Unconventional Warfare by its very definition involves 
those methods and tactics that are used outside the normal 
or conventional lanes of the military. 
D. WHAT SOF BRINGS TO THE TABLE 
One of the most important things that SOF would bring 
to the inter-agency mission of terrorist financing is its 
unconventional mindset and focus.  Having SOF look at 
terrorist financing with this unconventional mindset would 
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not be necessarily provide a better or worse perspective 
than the LEA’s, simply different. 
This mindset would, however, view terrorist financial 
networks as the enemy and not as a criminal network.  A SOF 
analysis would be to probe these networks for weaknesses 
and then target those weaknesses for exploitation or 
elimination.   
LEA’s should not be demeaned for their law enforcement 
focus of terrorist financing, which, in the past, has 
placed an emphasis on prosecution and building a case for a 
court of law, rather than prevention before and actual 
crime takes place.  When the GWOT falls back below the 
military horizon, that is the precisely the focus that the 
will need to have as they continue to fight terrorism. 
The other key element that SOF would bring to 
terrorist financing is its access and placement throughout 
the world.  Through the conduct of SOF core missions, these 
SOF elements routinely go to not only combat zones, but 
also to countries where we are not at war, yet are 
countries in which the terrorists operate in a permissible 
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III. SECONDARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This chapter will address the secondary research 
questions associated with a SOF role in combating terrorist 
financing.  It will also go into more detail on how the 
Special Operations Debrief And Retrieval System (SODARS) 
format may be used as a tool for SOF in gathering 
intelligence on terrorist financing.   
Recently the military has begun implementing Terrorist 
Financing Exploitation Units (TEFU) with the first being 
CENCTOM.  This thesis will only be able to go into limited 
detail as to the specific role of the TFEU due to 
classification restrictions.  However, here is an 
unclassified DoD Directive on terrorist financing that 
outlines the roles and responsibilities of the DoD. 
A. SECONDARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Should SOF Be Utilized in a New Role in Order to 
Combat Terrorist Financing? 
This not necessarily a new role for SOF, but in 
actuality it’s simply modifying an already existing role 
that SOF assumes when training with other nations’ 
militaries OCONUS.  This thesis in no way advocates that 
targeting terrorist financing become a core mission for 
SOF.  Rather, by gathering intelligence on terrorist 
financing, SOF would simply enhance the efforts that are 
already being conducted by other U.S. government agencies 
outside of DoD.  Being a force multiplier is already a 
proven attribute of SOF. 
Whereas in the past, SOF has been a force multiplier 
for operational forces, it can also be a force multiplier 
for intelligence gathering capabilities.  SOF already 
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passively collects intelligence when it deploys on 
operational and training missions outside the U.S.  This is 
done to gather local situational awareness for force 
protection of the SOF element.  Many times, through this 
passive collection, the SOF element learns of intelligence 
that is of no immediate military value, but may be of 
significant value to other non-military U.S. and coalition 
governmental agencies experiencing intelligence gaps on 
terrorist and criminal networks they are attempting to map 
in order to gain an operational picture of such networks 
and judge their capabilities and potential threat to the 
U.S. and its allies. 
Innovation is nothing new to SOF; it is in fact, one 
of SOF’s trademarks.  Organizations, both military and 
commercial must continue to be both innovative and relevant 
if they are to remain viable in the marketplace.  
Government agencies such as the military which are not 
required to turn a profit merely have the luxury of 
additional time before they are forced to change to stay 
competitive. 
In the past SOF has shown that it was both adaptable 
and relevant when unconventional forces were needed to 
fight a guerrilla war in Vietnam and also when used for the 
War on Drugs in Latin America. 
Throughout the years the core tasks assigned to SOF 
have changed and modified so that SOF could be engaged to 
combat emerging threats to the U.S. 
2. What Steps Has Dod/SOF Taken Thus Far in 
Addressing Terrorist Financing? 
A draft of a recent DoD directive has established 
policy and assigned responsibilities and authorities for 
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Threat Finance Exploitation (TFE) doctrine, organization, 
training, and equipment within the Department of Defense.14 
This DoD Directive was needed in order to clarify the 
roles and responsibilities of DoD with regard to financing.  
The purpose and necessity for the DoD to become involved in 
terrorist financing is stated in the first paragraph of the 
Directive. 
Adversaries fund operations by using unofficial 
banking systems, legitimate businesses, front 
companies, wealthy backers, state and non-state 
sponsors, non-governmental organizations, and 
criminal activities, including drug trafficking.  
Although other government agencies (OGA) lead the 
interagency efforts to address such funding 
operations, the Department of Defense has a 
growing role.  In some situations, the Department 
of Defense may be assigned a leading role.  In 
others, the Department of Defense’s unique 
capabilities shall be increasingly called upon to 
enhance the efforts of OGAs.15  
This Directive also names USSOCOM as the Executive 
Agent within DoD responsible for terrorist financing as 
outlined below in section 5.9 of the Directive. 
5.9. The Commander, United States Special 
Operations Command, is the DoD Executive agent 
for executing TFE policy.  USSOCOM 
responsibilities include, but are not limited to, 
those tasks in subparagraphs 5.9.1. through 
5.9.11 below.  Commander USSOCOM has designated 
the Director, Center for Special Operations as 
the DoD office of primary responsibility for TFE 
matters responsible for executing his Executive 
Agent functions.  The DoD Executive Agent for the 
TFE shall lead, synchronize, and integrate TFE 
doctrine, organization, training, and equipment 
                     14 DoD Directive, Initial Draft on Threat Finance Exploitation, 5 
July 2005. 
15 DoD Directive, Initial Draft on Threat Finance Exploitation, 5 
July 2005. 
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of the Department of Defense to develop 
capabilities to conduct TFE activities.  USOCOM 
shall: 
5.9.1. Report through the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense on 
TFE activities, while at the same time keeping 
ASD(SOLIC) informed. 
5.9.2. Assist, facilitate, and coordinate TFE 
matters with the Military Departments, Military 
Services, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Combatant 
Commands, Defense Agencies, DoD Field Activities, 
and OGAs. 
5.9.3. Establish and provide TFE functional 
expertise to DoD Components and assist them in 
implementing Secretary of Defense TFE policies 
and DoD Directives, including training, planning, 
and operations.  
5.9.4. Advise and support the Combatant Commands 
and Military Departments on TFE intelligence 
collection and production to ensure they reflect 
and satisfy command and interagency requirements.  
Ensure Combatant Commands and Military 
Departments establish threat finance as a 
critical intelligence focus, in accordance with 
DOD policy priority given to TFE. 
5.9.5. Recommend TFE policy requirements to ASD 
SOLIC and operational requirements to the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
5.9.6. Coordinate within the Department of 
Defense implementation of DoD policies and 
Instructions concerning TFE. 
5.9.7. Synchronize TFE activities to ensure 
applicable integration, standardization, and 
effectiveness in training, security, planning, 
and operations, in coordination with JFCOM, as 
appropriate. 
5.9.8. Advocate TFE annual requirements in the 
Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) 
process and monitor implementation. 
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5.9.10. Validate budgetary and personnel 
requirements to support TFE. 
5.9.11. Periodically review TFE capabilities and 
recommend improvements to ASD SOLIC and the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
5.9.13. Maintain responsibility for specialized 
TFE training and intelligence support 
requirements and associated programs, including 
activities in support of special missions units. 
Other than establishing this directive, the only 
operational units to emerge is the TFEU as part of Central 
Command (CENTCOM).  USSOCOM has not done very much to 
address the problem of terrorist financing leaving it to 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the United 
States Treasury Department to pursue as criminal matters.       
The TFEU concept emerged in IRAQ in 2004 as part of the 
Iraqi Steering Group (ISG) as a way to reduce the financial 
capabilities of terror networks to finance terrorist 
operations and training.    
3. Does the Current SODARS Format Lend Itself to SOF 
Use in Providing Relevant Information Needed to 
Gather Intelligence on Terrorist Financing? 
This thesis also examines the use of the SODARS as a 
means of capturing, processing, and disseminating 
intelligence on terrorist financing activity. 
a. Background 
(U) SODARS is a systematic method of capturing 
and disseminating operational and intelligence information 
obtained by U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) during 
overseas deployments.  This information is then used by 
other U.S. SOF in preparation for future deployments to the 
same areas of operation (AOR).  SODARS reports combine 
operations and intelligence information.  SODARS reports 
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(U) Executive Order 12333, Dod Directive 5240.1R, 
DoD Directive 5240.2, and appropriate service regulations, 
prohibit US Army SOF from engaging in the HUMINT collection 
process without appropriate approval and coordination.  SOF 
are, however charged with the responsibility to be 
observant while deployed on OCONUS missions.  This 
obligation to passively observe does not constitute 
intelligence collection.  Secretly taking pictures, drawing 
sketches, listening to conversations, and making 
surreptitious entries into restricted areas are examples of 
illegal intelligence collection, and are strictly 
prohibited. 
Requesting permission of the host government to 
take pictures or to draw sketches to turn over to follow-on 
teams, normal observation of military training/formations, 
and asking normal questions about military equipment, 
personnel and events, are examples of legal means of 
obtaining information.  This distinction between 
intelligence collection and passive observation must be 
emphasized at all levels of command. 
(U) USSOCOM Directive 11-1 has been revised to 
emphasize SOF as “Global Scouts” who are often the only 
U.S. military presence in certain areas/regions and have 
access to information not readily available, and generally 
possessing a high degree of reliability.  While the main 
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goal of the SODARS program remains to support SOF 
deployments, the significance and importance of the “global 
scouting” to the national intelligence community continues 
to increase.16 
The SODARS format would be a good means for SOF 
assets to report on terrorist financing as it is already a 
format with which SOF is familiar and no further burden 
such as learning a new reporting format on the tactical 
element conducting the mission. 
4. What Additional Coordination/Liaison Would Be 
Needed Between USSOCOM/SOC’s and Other Government 
Agencies? 
CENTCOM has already stood up the Threat Finance 
Exploitation Unit (TFEU) at MacDill AFB in Tampa, FL.    
The theater SOC responsible for GCC where the SOF element 
is conducting the operation would be responsible for 
reviewing any SOF elements post mission, completed SODARS 
and passing to USSOCOM any relevant intelligence related to 
terrorist financing.   
5. What, If Any, Additional Training Would Be 
Necessary for SOF to Contribute Towards the 
Targeting of Terrorist Financing? 
The answer is “very little,” since, again, for SOF 
such targeting merely involves the passive collection of 
intelligence.  If intelligence related to terrorist 
financing is not observed by the SOF element, then it need 
not be reported.  Much of the technical expertise needed 
for the intricacies of processing the financial data can be 
accessed through inter-agency cooperation and eventually 
brought into DoD through additional training as well as the 
financial background skill sets brought in by Reservists 
                     16 United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) Reg 381-1 
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and National Guardsmen who are activated and augmenting 
standing units.  
6. What, If Any Additional Manning Requirements 
Would Be Necessary to Manage the SOF Efforts 
Toward Targeting Terrorist Financing?   
Using the modified table of organization and equipment 
(MTOE) of the TFEU in CENTCOM as a starting template, there 
would need to be additional TFEU’s set up in the other 
Combatant Commands.   
7. Is SOF in a Position Through Joint Combined 
Exchange Training (JCET), Humanitarian Assistance 
(HA), Organizational Control Element (OCE), and 
Humanitarian Demining Operations (HDO) Missions 
to Collect Relevant Actionable Intelligence 
Toward Targeting Terrorist Financing? 
It is precisely the conduct of these types of core 
missions that give SOF the access and placement in order to 
be able to passively collect the intelligence that is 
necessary to gain an operational picture on the terrorist 
networks.  At the same time, it is imperative that this 
passive collection remain a secondary role to that of the 
primary purpose of training or operations for which SOF was 










IV. A COLLABORATIVE EFFORT 
The success or mediocrity of an inter-agency approach 
to combating terrorist financing may not lie in exactly 
which government agency acts in the role of executive 
agent, but rather, in how it is organized do it.  There are 
inherent pitfalls with new organizations, which the 
Department of Homeland Security is learning as it goes 
through its growing pains.   
It is paramount that not only should this new DoD 
organization with the mission of terrorist financing within 
USSOCOM be organized properly at its genesis, but that it 
be given sufficient latitude to evolve so that it remain 
viable and relevant to the task for which it was created.  
In order to effectively though by no means efficiently, 
because it will become bureaucratic to a certain extent 
prosecute the GWOT for both the DoD and national security 
interests, it must be allowed to change as the threats to 
the United States change, or it will forever be reactive 
instead of proactive when engaging threats to the United 
States. 
The synchronization and coordination of multiple 
agencies that not only have different mission statements, 
different jurisdictions, different charters, different 
authorities, but also different mindsets will be 
problematic at the least.   
Within USSOCOM it is the Center for Special Operations 
(CSO) that will be the action arm in implementing USSOCOM’s 
executive agent role in the GWOT.  Prior to the designation 
of USSOCOM in this role, the DoD had been involved in 
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terrorist financing, but only in a limited scope and at the 
lower levels of the military.   
For example, Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), which is 
responsible for Central and South America, as well as the 
Caribbean, has been interested in the money flows of both 
Islamic Extremist groups and drug cartels.  At the same 
time, Pacific Command (PACOM) is interested in the 
financial structure of the Philippines based terrorist 
group Jemaah Islamiyah (JI).  While the largest effort had 
been in CENTCOM, with the establishment of the Threat 
Finance Exploitation Unit (TFEU) a pilot program that was 
formed in Iraq to address the problem of terrorist 
financing.  This TFEU was a forward deployed and part of 
the Iraqi Working Group in August 2004 and designed to look 
at the financial dealings of terrorists and insurgents as 
well as broadening how DoD looks at the terrorist 
organization as a network, with finance as a part of that 
network.   
With the success of the TFEU in CENTCOM and the 
interest by other Combatant Commands in terrorist 
financing, an over-arching DoD level program was needed to 
resource, coordinate, and give authority to DoD elements 
for terrorist financing.  This led to the DOD Directive 
discussed in Chapter Three being written in December 2005. 
The language in the DoD Directive substituted the 
phrase “threat finance” in place of the phrase “terrorist 
finance” in order to allow the Combatant Commands to target 
threats in their Areas of Responsibilities (AOR’s) that are 
not on designated lists of terrorist groups, but are still 
of concern to stability in the region.  These threats 
include such entities as insurgents, warlords, and 
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organized crime, which may operate in one Combatant 
Commands AOR, but are not to the level that they operate 
across multiple AOR’s as a global terrorist threat would.  
This DOD Directive will empower all the Combatant 
Commands to address the threat finance in their AOR’s, yet 
it is flexible enough to tailor the program to each area’s 
unique situation.  A TFEU in European Command (EUCOM) may 
operate differently from a TFEU in PACOM.  The threat 
finance situation in the EUCOM AOR is contrasted by one of 
the world’s most sophisticated banking system in Europe 
with one of the world’s most unsophisticated or traditional 
banking systems in the countries of North Africa.  The 
EUCOM TFEU will need to be flexible enough to deal with 
both systems. 
While this is a new area for the DoD, the need has 
been building over the years and Operation Iraqi Freedom/ 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OIF/OEF) only put the problem 
in the spotlight.   The fall of the Soviet Union led to the 
highly sensationalized instances of WMD chemical, 
biological and nuclear components and technology, as well 
as complete WMD systems, appearing on the black market.  
This possibility of strategic weapons being available to 
anyone with enough money showed that finances were just as 
important as ideology when terrorists wanted to be able 
make a statement on the world stage.  It also showed that 
the United States was ill-prepared to handle this problem, 
because, at the time, the Unified Command Plan (UCP), which 
delegates AOR’s to the Combatant Commands for most of the 
world, had not given any specific Combatant Command the 
responsibility for Russia.  That was only remedied recently  
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when EUCOM began to include Russia in its AOR, and the rest 
of the former Soviet Union was divided up among EUCOM, 
CENTCOM, and PACOM. 
So with all these competing factors of diplomatic, 
security, jurisdiction, and authority issues, USSOCOM must 
organize, coordinate, and synchronize a DoD, domestic, 
inter-agency and international cooperative effort that will 
not only work together, but accomplish its stated purpose 
listed in the DoD Directive previously noted in Chapter 
Three.  What factors should USSOCOM consider as it sets up 
threat finance organization?  How will it effectively 
manage an organization that some will see as too close to 
domestic issues for a DoD role and not diplomatic enough 
for international issues?  
Realists tell us that for all intents and 
purposes, states behave as rational unitary 
actors.  In an anarchic international system, 
power rules the day, and states have little 
choice but to protect themselves.  We need not 
consider any domestic-level factors such as 
foreign policy agencies or individual leaders to 
understand why alliances form, why wars occur, or 
why international organizations arise.  In fact, 
it is precisely by ignoring these sub national 
influences that realists can offer such a general 
theory of international politics. 
But for realists to be right, national security 
agencies must be well designed to serve the needs 
of the state.17 
To help with this, Amy Zegart, the author of Flawed By 
Design, offers a hypothesis on how organizations should not 
only be formed when they are initially organized, but how 
they should evolve as well.  USSOCOM would do well to keep 
this hypothesis in mind. 
                     17 Zegart, Amy B., Flawed by Design 
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Agency origins 
Proposition 1:  An agency’s original design is 
determined by international, not domestic, 
factors. 
Proposition 2:  National security agencies are 




Proposition 3:  Agencies evolve in response to 
changes in the international system. 
Proposition 4:  Congressional oversight does not 
matter; agencies are well designed at the outset 
and are responsive to ongoing changes in the 
international system. 
 
Proposition 5:  An individual agency’s evolution 
can be explained by systemic-level factors-by the 
state’s place in the international system, by the 
distribution of power among states, and by the 
security imperatives these two factors generate.18 
Those who think that a TFEU will simply follow the 
money in a terrorist network will miss the fact that they 
are not simply following the money for money’s sake.  
Instead they are tracing the financial flows of threat 
organizations in order to map the terrorist network.  Where 
this mapping will take them is not known for certain.  That 
is why an inter-agency effort is so important.  Should 
money trails lead back to a U.S. citizen, the DoD would 
have no authority to investigate, but the FBI would.  And 
                     18 Zegart, Amy B., Flawed by Design 
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if the money should lead to a country that we are allied 
with or outside the OIF/OEF combat zones that the DoD is 
operating in, the Department of State should pursue it 












































The new DoD Directive on Threat Finance Exploitation 
goes into great detail about the responsibilities within 
DoD for threat finance, as well establishing the policies 
for inter-agency cooperation.  What it lacks is a mission 
statement that will tell those in DoD and other government 
agencies just how this new organization is going to 
accomplish its mission. 
Traditionally a military commander will issue 
directives to a subordinate in the form of an operation 
order (OPORD) in which the subordinate clearly understands 
what is to be accomplished, who is to do it, when it needs 
to be done, where it needs to be done, and why it is 
necessary to accomplish it.  What is left for the 
subordinate to determine is how to do it. 
The DoD Directive is similar, leaving it up to USSOCOM 
to determine its mission in respect to threat finance.  So 
how should USSOCOM organize itself to define not only its 
mission, but what strategy it will plan and execute, with 
other agencies, in order to achieve that mission,  
hopefully keeping in mind that the threat finance 
organization’s self-determined mission is the reason for 
its very existence? 
Using a business world model as an example, USSOCOM 
will not only have to determine its mission, but also the 
environment in which it will perform its mission.  Henry 
Mintzberg author of The Structuring of Organizations: A 
Synthesis of the Research, could show that the 
complex/unstable, organic, decentralized environment would 
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lean towards an adhocracy as the basic type of 
configuration.  Coordination would be achieved through 
informal mutual adjustment and formalized horizontal 
communications, where the different members of this inter-
agency organization would interact and communicate in order 
to implement a coordinated and effective strategy.19  The 
chain of command still remains critical, especially for 
prioritization in the face of competing interests and for 
direction setting, but horizontal and informal 
communications would become the primary means of 
coordination and provide the foundation on which the chain 
of command would depend.  
The adhocracy configuration of an organization is 
needed to be effective due to the number of highly 
specialized people from the different inter-agencies that 
need a high degree of liaison and coordination in order for 
decisions to be made in a complex and unstable environment.  
Further, where innovation is required to address unique 
problems, an over-arching effort like the GWOT is needed.  
The existing bureaucratic structures within the DoD, as 
well as the other existing government agencies, are too 
inflexible to allow the experts that reside within each of 
these separate agencies to liaison effectively with other 
agencies in an over-arching strategy needed to execute the 
GWOT mission.  The adhocratic nature of this new 
organization would allow for the high degree of 
coordination and mutual adjustment necessary among the 
highly specialized existing parent agencies.  
 
                     19 Mintzberg, Henry, The Structure of Organizations: A Synthesis of 
Research, Prentice-Hall, 1979 
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A. IDENTITY CRISIS 
Once configured as an organization, the new inter-
agency unit must realize that it must function as part of 
the already existing DoD and inter-agency bureaucracies as 
well as operate outside the same bureaucracies in order to 
be effective.  Bureaucracies by their vary nature can be 
inflexible and resistant to change; the paradox is in an 
existing bureaucracy creating a new organization because it 
recognizes a need to address a new threat that falls 
outside the traditional role of that existing organization.  
Yet the first thing the parent organization wants to do is 
impose the existing bureaucratic controls on the new 
organization, knowing all the while that it was the 
inflexibility of the parent organization to address a new 
threat that necessitated creating the new organization in 
the first place. 
B. GWOT VS RWOT 
USSOCOM must realize that it will not fight the GWOT 
in as much as it will manage it through the allocation of 
resources to the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC)’s.  It 
is at the Combatant Command level where the threat in the 
CENTCOM AOR is different from that of the PACOM AOR, which 
is different from that of the SOUTHCOM AOR, that the 
regional commanders will shape the strategy to address 
their theaters’ own unique threat in a regional war on 
terror (RWOT).   
The center of gravity in an unconventional war such as 
the GWOT is the local populace.  That is why the war must 
be fought at the local level while managed from the USSOCOM 
and inter-agency levels. 
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Delegating authority, decision making capabilities, 
and most importantly resources down to the GCC level, while 
still coordinating and synchronizing those resources, does 
not mean that USSOCOM will lose oversight and “control” of 
the GWOT.  It is instead now empowering the GCC’s to 
conduct their RWOT with SOF resources not normally found at 
the GCC level.  In business terms it is implementing 
vertical, selective decentralization.  In the GWOT, for DoD 
to simply be effective is not enough, it must also be 
efficient.      
USSOCOM can maintain situational awareness of the RWOT 
through the GCC’s Theater Special Operations Command 
(TSOC).  The TSOC is a subordinate unit of the GCC, but is 
made up of both SOF and conventional personnel.  These 
USSOCOM resources would be under the tactical control 
(TACON) of the TSOC Commander, while still remaining under 
the operational control (OPCON) to USSOCOM.  
TACON gives the TSOC and GCC the ability to task and 
control the movement within the GCC AOR of SOF resources in 
order to accomplish the Theaters RWOT.  At the same time 
USSOCOM still has OPCON of these SOF resources and will 
dictate how they are organized, employed, trained, and 
assigned.  SOF is a finite resource and its employment must 
be prioritized by USSOCOM to the different GCC’s based on 
the needs of the GCC and the SOF Mission Criteria detailed 
in Chapter 2.    
C. CONCLUSION 
The purpose once again was to determine if there was a 
role for the DoD in general and for SOF specifically in 
combating terrorist financing. 
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Using SOF’s own mission criteria that were established 
to determine whether a mission should or shouldn’t be 
executed by SOF, it is possible to show that the passive 
gathering of intelligence on terrorist financing could be 
accomplished by SOF as an ancillary mission during the 
conduct of SOF’s core missions. 
Using SOF personnel to gather intelligence and combat 
terrorist financing is only utilizing them in a role that 
emphasizes SOF as “Global Scouts” who are often the only 
U.S. military presence in certain areas/regions and have 
access to information not readily available but generally 
possessing a high degree of reliability, thus increasing 
the significance and importance of the “global scouting” to 
the national intelligence community. 
During the writing of the thesis, USSOCOM has been 
tasked with incorporating terrorist financing into the 
GWOT. 
Though USSOCOM is the DoD executive agent in the GWOT, 
it cannot be stressed enough that this is an inter-agency 
effort and not a unilateral one.  It is the unconventional 
and asymmetric nature of the GWOT that has made the inter-
agency approach a marriage of necessity rather than a 
marriage of convenience.  Because in a conventional 
environment that is the United States government, this new 
inter-agency organization will be anything but convenient.  
Competitive cultures, inter-agency rivalries, budgetary 
limitations, and bureaucratic processes die hard, but all 
these obstacles and many others will have to be overcome in 
order to succeed. 
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Despite the difficulties addressed in this thesis, 
there exists a definite role for SOF in combating terrorist 
financing as part of the GWOT.  The measure of success will 
be when terrorism falls back below the military horizon and 
once again becomes a primarily law enforcement issue rather 
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